Migration from Africa

## Narrative Dynamics in the German Public Sphere

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opportunities

for a fair narrative on migration

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Migration from Africa
Narrative Dynamics in the German Public Sphere

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Abstract

The term *Fluchtursachenbekämpfung* (which can be loosely translated in English as: addressing the root causes of irregular migration) has become a buzzword for development policies in Germany that are geared at curbing migration from Africa by attempting to 'solve' the root causes of irregular migration in home countries. Using the idea of narrative dynamics (Sommer, "Migration"), this paper aims at showing that such a one-sided, Euro-centered perspective on migration from Africa to Europe side-steps the potential for other perspectives about (irregular) migration that focus on possible contributions of (long-standing) African diasporic communities to economic growth in the host and home countries. Secondly, by pointing out the blind spots of a Euro-centered perspective on migration, the paper opens up the possibility of transforming the debate on migration in Germany's public sphere from narratives that merely talk about migrants to narratives that engage with migrants and long-standing diasporic communities in order to explore the debate on migration from the perspective of migrants.

1. Introduction

Migration has become a sensitive policy field in Europe in recent years since the so-called 'migration crisis' in 2015-2016. Public debates on migration in Europe are not only stereotypical and one-sided, they have increasingly become toxic and often serve as 'fodder' for "anti-democratic ways of reasoning, anti-science worldviews, hostile opinion-building strategies, and the dismissal of "mainstream" journalism" (cf. Sommer, "Migration" 498). So far the OPPORTUNITIES project has addressed issues of storytelling in the migration debate by introducing the concepts of level telling field (Sommer and Gebauer, "Beyond", 7) and narrative dynamics (Sommer, "Migration"). The idea of a level telling field is based on a metaphor used in economics – the level playing field – which ensures fair conditions for players or competitors in the market. Transferring this metaphor to narrative, or more specifically, to discourses on migration means that storytelling on the topic of migration should be based on the principles of 'fair play'. This means that narrative agency should be afforded to refugees and migrants in the same way that political analysts and stakeholders in the public sphere engage in debates about migration. "[L]evel telling fields […] call for a more fair narrative on migration; one which doesn't merely talk *about* refugees and migrants but speaks *with* them" (Sommer and Gebauer 8, original emphasis). The concept of narrative dynamics precedes from the premise that the public sphere is "an environment, ecosystem, or market where ideas, values, beliefs, attitudes, worldviews, and norms are circulated, modified, negotiated, and exchanged […] (Sommer, "Migration" 498). Narrative dynamics research allows us to examine the salient features of narrative transactions, key characteristics of and forms of storytelling and story sharing as well as their functions.

This paper examines public debates and the ensuing discourses or 'grand' narratives about migration from Africa in Germany generated in such public spaces. Central to the discussion in the chapters that follow is an analysis of the one-sided idea in public debates in Germany (since the Merkel regime) that 'addressing the root causes of irregular migration' (German transl: *Fluchtursachenbekämpfung*), can stop irregular migration from Africa to Europe. In a speech[1] to members of Parliament (in the *Bundestag*) in Berlin in November 2015, the then Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, speaks about a whopping 850 million euros that the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development has planned to channel to addressing acute root causes of irregular migration. The tenor in Merkel's speech is that home countries, particularly in Africa, and transit countries especially Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, would be given financial support to help them accommodate refugees from Africa and the Middle East so that "the numbers of refugees that reach Europe is curbed" (Merkel 8). Furthermore, investing millions of euros in Turkey would help curb illegal forms of migration. In chapter 2 we juxtapose this one-sided narrative and perspective on (irregular) migration that is, migration as a threat, with competing narratives and perspectives on migration that view migration as an opportunity, for instance, for economic growth for home and host countries.

This paper also uses the concept of a level telling field as a premise for a change of perspective in public debates on migration. While migration and migrants from Africa are discussed and debated about in the public sphere, very seldom does one hear about migration from the point of view of (irregular) migrants, let alone hear about the contributions of (irregular) migrants, refugees and members of the African diaspora to the socioeconomic development of Germany and home countries in Africa. The discussion in chapter 3 allows for this change in perspective.

2. *Fluchtursachenbekämpfung*: Narrative Dynamics of Discourses on Migration in Germany

This chapter briefly explores the narrative dynamics of discourses on migration from Africa in the German public sphere, particularly in political debates about the so-called 'migration crisis' in Europe since 2015 and 2016. The goal of doing so is two-fold. First, we examine a dominant narrative about migration from Africa in the German public sphere – the idea that (irregular) migration poses a threat to Europe and, therefore, its root causes should be 'addressed'. The term *Fluchtursachenbekämpfung* has become a buzzword for development policies geared at curbing migration from Africa by attempting to 'solve' the root causes of irregular migration in the home countries. Using the idea of narrative dynamics (Sommer, "Migration"), we would like to show that such a one-sided, Euro-centered perspective on migration from Africa to Europe side steps the potential of other perspectives about (irregular) migration that focus on possible contributions of (long-standing) African diasporic communities to economic growth in host and the home countries. Secondly, by pointing out the blind spots of a Euro-centered perspective on migration, we would like to open up the possibility of transforming the debate on migration in Germany's public sphere from narratives about (irregular) migration as a threat to narratives about migration as an opportunity for economic growth.

According to Sommer ("Migration", 499) examining the narrative dynamics of a phenomenon involves focusing on the "connections and interdependencies between different kinds of stories, as well as old and new forms and practices of storytelling and storysharing […]." Examining the narrative dynamics of the debates about migration from Africa in the German public sphere is cognizant of the fact that migration is a "particularly sensitive policy field" (Sommer 498) in Europe today. It is increasingly characterized by a 'clash' of narratives such as narratives of crisis management, discourses of xenophobia and racism as well as humanitarian storytelling (cf. ibid). The idea behind 'addresing the root causes of irregular migration' is that Germany's developmental policy makers see it fit to use a top-down approach to set measures that will "enable (potential) migrants to enjoy brighter prospects in their countries of origin through job creation measures so that they do not embark on the dangerous journey to Europe (or Germany) in the first place" (Schraven 7). Therefore, the idea that the root causes of irregular migration can be addressed using developmental cooperation as a tool is based on a simplistic logic – creating jobs and other prospects for migrants in their home countries will curb irregular migration, or more precisely, prevent African migrants from coming to Europe to seek these prospects.

As scholars of migration have argued, the logic behind the idea of 'addressing the root causes of migration' not only contains blind spots, it also tends to ignore the positive correlation between migration and (economic) development (cf. Schraven 31; Müller 9). The most obvious blind spots include; a strong focus solely on (irregular) migration from Africa and, secondly, a strong focus on economic factors as the leading cause of migration. According to Schraven, there are two reasons why the narrative about addressing root causes of irregular migration tends to focus on migration flows from Africa. He cites the increasing numbers of refugees from sub-Saharan Africa after 2015 and the establishment of migration policy initiatives by the European Union (EU) supposed to address irregular migration from Africa (cf. Schraven 30). Examples of such policy initiatives include the European Agenda on Migration and the

EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa)[2] which were launched in May and November 2015, respectively.

Having been launched after the deadly shipwreck in Lampedusa in May 2015, the European Agenda on Migration pushed for tighter policies on EU refugee intake. In 2016 several proposals within this policy initiative were released. These proposals have called for EU border controls to be tightened and have suggested that the EU border regime be externalized to North Africa and beyond (cf. Georgi 99; Amnesty International 5). In its annual report from 2018 the EUTF[3] for Africa claims that there has been improved 'migration management' through its cooperation with countries like Libya in the evacuation of stranded refugees in Libya. Such cooperation with authoritarian regimes makes palpable the argument that by doing so Europe is intensifying its border regime and securitization measures against migrants from Africa. As repeatedly reported by mainstream media houses, such as CNN, between 2017 and 2019 such measures of migration management have been accused of being complicit in the criminalization of migration (see Schraven 30; Amnesty International 1) and for turning a blind eye at the inhumane conditions for migrants and refugees in Libya, a transit country.[4]

Another blind spot in the narrative about addressing the root causes of irregular migration is the strong focus on economic factors as the leading cause of irregular migration. This tends to ignore other equally important causes of irregular migration to Europe such as armed conflict, political suppression, demographic factors, and climate change (cf. Braunsdorf 7; Müller 9). The implication of a narrative that solely considers economic factors as the leading cause of migration from Africa is that it perpetuates an image of Africa as a continent of catastrophes, hunger, repression and that most migrants from Africa must be economic migrants. According to the migration hump theory[5], migration for long distances (for instance from Africa to Asia) is possible from a per capita income of around $7,000-13,000, not less (cf. Klingholz 4). Fargues (6) observes that higher levels of education have a similar effect – highly educated people tend to migrate more often and for longer distances compared to migrants with lower levels of education.

The appeal of migration to highly skilled individuals and high earners can be compared to EU-funded mobility programs for pupils, students, early career researchers, young people and university staff from the EU. A case in point is the Erasmus program which was established by the European Union in 1987.[6] The idea about migration (for foreseeable amounts of time) implied in such EU mobility programs is positive. Some of the objectives of the Erasmus+ program include; individual, professional and personal growth.[7] These are motors for innovation that are required for strengthening European identity and active citizenship. While the potential for physical movement in and outside Europe is seen in a positive light within such mobility programs, it seems a paradox then, that this idea about migration does not translate to harnessing the potential of migration from Africa to Europe.

It has been shown in the literature on migration that there is a positive relationship between migration and economic development (cf. Braunsdorf). This is shown, for instance, by remittances and monetary investments made by migrants in their countries of origin. Such remittances are much higher compared to the modest budget of Germany's development aid. In 2018 remittances sent to sub-Saharan African countries by migrants amounted to $46 billion (cf. Braunsdorf 7) while, according to data from the World Bank, the net official development aid to sub-Saharan African countries from all OECD countries combined amounted to $50.88 billion in 2018.[8] Remittances come from both migrants living legally as well as those living illegally that is, those without legal residency in the respective host country. Indeed, according to the research study *Scaling Fences* by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, "Scaling Fences")[9], remittances represent over 90% of real income at home for those who were working before they decided to migrate. Furthermore, important findings of the study also show that the creation of hostile policy environments for illegal migrants is less likely to force them to return to their home countries – the reverse is true. "Assisting people to achieve their objectives while contributing legally and at full capacity to the European labour market may better incentivize them to ultimately return home,

while creating win-win outcomes from migration" (UNDP, "Scaling Fences", 8).

It is worth noting that the major causes of migration, including economic factors such as poverty and related demographic factors, are endogenous and 'deep-seated' structural problems that Germany's development policy alone can hardly solve (cf. Klingholz 5; Braunsdorf 7; Müller 11). These insights about the blind spots of the narrative about addressing root causes of irregular migration call for a change of perspective. For policy makers this means considering perspectives about migration that consider migration as an opportunity for economic growth rather than as a threat. The discussion in this chapter so far has shown that research on migration from Africa challenges the simple logic implied in the narrative of *Fluchtursachenbekämpfung* ('addressing the root causes of irregular migration') that continues to dominate discourses on migration from Africa in the German public sphere. Taking into account research on migration from Africa can help with the perspectival change from viewing migration as a threat to harnessing the benefits of migration.

Furthermore, a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach is more likely to yield perspectival change in the migration debate. If the contributions of migrants and members of the African diaspora are acknowledged more, this will create a more balanced debate on migration in the German public sphere. Like the statistics about the monetary remittances viz a viz foreign aid from OECD countries have shown, the contribution of migrants and members of the African diaspora to the economic development of their home countries is significant. We suggest that engaging migrants and African diasporic communities in the migration debate is important because not only are they experts on the root causes of why people migrate, they are also more likely to be in a better position to provide 'insider' knowledge about how to harness the benefits of migration from Africa.

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In order to open up the migrant and diaspora perspective in the migration debate, it is important to understand the terms diaspora and related terms like migrant as well as global migration movements cosmopolitanism and transnationalism. Exploring these terms and concepts shows the complex web of movements embedded in the fabric of migration from Africa. Becoming aware of this complexity shows that simple answers with a simple policy logic such as 'addressing the root causes of irregular migration' are not the most appropriate solutions to complex 'problems'. Moreover, one-sided, nationalist and Euro-centered debates have hardly stopped nor curbed irregular migration so far. However, balanced debates that engage with, rather than merely talk about, the people that embark on the journey to Europe are more likely to yield sustainable changes in the migration debate. The following chapter discusses the relevance of the term diaspora in the migration debate. Specifically, the discussion briefly explores the development of the term diaspora and its tensions with related terms like migrant, refugee, exile, expat as well as related global movements like transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, the discussion below also briefly explores the role of race, racialization and racism for the African diaspora and migrant experience.

3. Diaspora: From classical to constructivist notions

Diaspora is a term whose earliest usage can be found in the bible that is, in Deuteronomy, the fifth book of the Old Testament. The the Greek word for diaspora – *diaspeirein* – is used in the Greek translation of the Old Testament to refer to the dispersion of Jewish people beyond the land of Israel (Cohen 2). In Jewish folk memory, two traumatic events have been attributed to the Jewish dispersion – slavery in ancient Egypt and the destruction of Solomon's temple in 586 BC by the Mesopotamian Empire (cf. ibid.). Since the 1960s academic scholarship of diasporas use the Jewish diaspora has been considered the paradigm for classical diasporas. This definition of a classical diaspora has been broadened in academic scholarship to include communities and groups that, like the biblical Jewish people, have moved from their 'original' homeland and settled in other countries and territories in the aftermath of traumatic events (cf. Cohen 4). Some other important tenets of classical diasporas have been listed by Safran (Safran 83ff.) and they include: a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long period of time, a collective memory or myth about the original homeland, idealizing this putative homeland to which there is hope of a return, commitment to the maintenance of this homeland and to its safety and prosperity, and the belief that members are, and perhaps, will always be 'pariahs' in their host countries – that is, they will remain partly separate from the majority society because they will never be fully accepted. Scholarship of other classical diasporas such as the Armenian, Greek and (old) African diaspora has been buttressed in this classical notion of diaspora (cf. Cohen 4).

Since the 1990s, the term diaspora has undergone a paradigmatic change. Its usage in academic inquiry is no longer confined to the classical notion of diaspora. Proponents of constructivism have suggested a new operationalization of the term in light of increasing global movements (cf. Cohen and Fischer, "Diaspora Studies"). Constructivist approaches locate diaspora within contemporary, global migration movements in post-1945 period. For example, Michele Reis ("Theorizing") posits that globalization has had an impact on diaspora movement due technological advances in telecommunication and transport. These technological developments, Reis posits, foster transnational bonds between dispersed groups and their homelands (17.). Hence concepts such as transnationalism and cosmopolitanism are relevant for constructive approaches to diaspora. Under a constructivist lens, diasporas need not break from their homeland, they remain (remotely) touch with it. The term 'contemporary diasporas' (Reis 47) has been used to describe dispersal to overseas territories without a decisive break with the homeland nor a permanent "uprooting" of the diasporic group in question.

Once used to distinctively describe the traumatic dispersal of a group of people (such as Jewish, Greek, and Armenian diasporas) Brubaker observes that diaspora, "now shares meanings with a larger 'semantic domain' that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guestworker, exile community, overseas community, ethnic community" (Brubaker 3). While paradigmatic approaches stress what can be termed the 'boundedness' of diaspora that is, diaspora as a primarily homogeneous community where solidarity and group cohesion are emphasized, constructivist approaches stress internal complexities of diasporic communities. Such internal complexities within diasporic groups are marked by transnational and intergenerational bonds tied, not to one singular notion of homeland, but to multilocal mappings of home (cf. Fortier, "Diaspora"; Tölölyan "Diaspora Studies", 27). This means that communities considered diasporic may constitute individuals and groups whose identities are

syncretic, creolized, fluid and, over time, are no longer bound to only one (original) homeland (cf. Tsolidis 6). The work of Paul Gilroy ("The Black Atlantic") and Stuart Hall ("Cultural Identity") has contributed to a constructivist framing of the Black/African diaspora. The diaspora experience of black Caribbean people in Britain, Hall posits, "is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity" (Hall 235). Gilroy uses the 'Black Atlantic' as a metaphor for a "system of cultural exchanges" (Gilroy 14) which provides a transnational perspective on black cultures, aesthetics and political histories in the Caribbean, Europe, North America and Africa.

The slippages between diaspora and related global movements as well as concepts such as transnationalism demonstrate difficulty of trying to define the term diaspora. The meaning of diaspora remains and its potential for conceptual clarity remain contested (cf. Tsolidis 5). Brubaker's essay "The Diaspora Diaspora") observes that everyday usage of the term diaspora is being uncritically adapted into scholarly inquiry into the term. In particular, terms such as the redneck diaspora and lesbian diaspora have made it into scholarly journals – something that Brubaker refers to as proliferation in meaning of diaspora. By 'proliferation' Brubaker is referring to the 'dispersion' of the term from its classical, paradigmatic usage. Brubaker cautions that diaspora will soon become an empty category that whose academic inquiry will be impossible).[10] However, proponents of constructivist approaches to diaspora embrace the conceptual complexity of the term diaspora and who it refers to (see Tsolidis 4). In particular constructivist approaches to diaspora ask questions such as: "*how* are diasporas made, *who* makes claims to be part of a diaspora, and *what* claims are made on behalf of a diaspora?" (cf. Cohen and Fischer 4, original emphasis). These questions engage with the idea of diaspora as an *imagined* community, to borrow a term associated with Benedict Anderson ("Imagined Communities")[11], and they also engage with the consequences of multiple forms of mobility and transnational bonds that are created and nurtured by (contemporary) diasporic communities.

What makes the African diaspora stand out from several other (classic and contemporary) diasporic formations is that the process of racialization was and remains central to and concomitant with different forms of dispersion (cf. Makalani 1). Speaking about the importance of visual technologies, Makalani (6) posits that "[w]ho is part of the African diaspora, who we envision when thinking about blackness, is as much a visual imaginary as a social formation […]." Transnational bonds have been particularly important in the emergence of African diasporic formations. Specifically, transnationalism is crucial in understanding the role that race and racialization have played in the formation of African diasporic communities across disparate spatial contexts. This is because race and racial oppression are a basis upon which transnational bonds of mobilization and anti-racist activism have been formed among members of the African diaspora.[12]

According to Hall, black diasporic identity and experience are a result of positioning oneself by looking back at history in order to excavate a past that has been 'lost' and a re-positioning of self within "the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power" (225). The first type of positioning is based on transnational bonds of solidarity with other individuals or groups that are rooted, as Hall says, in "one shared culture, a sort of collective 'one true self' […] which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common" (223). These bonds of solidarity are, for example, articulated in the creation of (activist) movements of resistance such as such as Pan Africanism and *Négritude* that were important catalysts for independence in many African countries in the 1960s. Using the British Caribbean experience as an example, Hall suggests that this version of the black diasporic experience is a result of positioning black identity within the crucible of historical contexts, in particular, the slave trade and colonialism. While the first type of positioning stresses oneness of diasporic groups, the second type of positioning is premised on heterogeneity. Hence, Hall also describes diaspora identities as "those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference" (235).

The tension between oneness and heterogeneity is characteristic of the notion of African diaspora. It is worth noting, however, that this tension may or may not play a major role in community-building. As the next chapter shows, the notion of diaspora is relevant for understanding that Afro-German community building originated in the need to create transnational bonds along racial lines. Given the structural forms of racism that first 'black' people in Germany were confronted with as far back as the during the 18th century, it made sense to mobilize and rally behind the common racial denominator in order to make their voices heard in a society in which they had been highly invisible. In the *Afrozensus* report[13] from the year 2020 the terms *schwarz*, *afrodiasporisch* and *afrikanisch* (black, afrodiasporic and African) are often used interchangeably to reference a group of people that have historically been identified as a group that is racially different, and who have subsequently identified themselves as such.

3.1 Origins of the African Diaspora in Germany: A Brief Overview

The classical understanding of the term "African diaspora" refers to people of African descent that have settled outside the continent. In Germany, as in other countries, the African diaspora can be found in different contexts: as representatives of a group of people in society, as individuals actively involved in the affairs of their countries of origin, and as part of a community whose internal structures members an individual may or may not be part of. The African diaspora mainly present in Germany's big cities and accounts for about one million people.[14] In Germany, the term African diaspora became an object of academic inquiry after 1945.

The African diaspora did not get recognition as a social actor in Germany's history until the late 1980s, because until then the activities of its representatives had remained largely ineffective. The first officially registered African in Germany was Georg Adolf Christiani, who arrived in Berlin in 1678 and was baptized in Spandau in 1681 (. The first African to speak up in a way that earned him recognition in Germany was Anton Wilhelm Amo, whose biography is emblematic of the history of the African diaspora in Germany. As a four-year-old, Amo was abducted from Ghana in 1707 and, after three years, handed over as a 'gift' to Duke Anton Ulrich of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel.

Following the example of his friend Tsar Peter the Great, at whose court the Ethiopian boy Ibrahim Hannibal had made it to the rank of general, the duke made it possible for young Amo to receive an education in humanism. At a time when there was hardly any public outcry about the enslavement of human beings, Anton Wilhelm Amo dedicated his master's thesis in philosophy (*De iure Maurorum in Europa – On the Rights of the Moors in Europe)* to the disenfranchisement of Africans in European societies. His master's thesis, which had been long forgotten, reminds us that the laws in the Roman Empire did not apply to individuals differently due to the color of their skin. In the Roman Empire the principle of freedom was as much a human right to citizens in the African territories as to citizens elsewhere in the empire. Hence, Amo's work points out that slavery represented a regression behind the standards of an earlier time. With his critique of the fundamental disadvantages facing African people in 18th century Europe, Amo exposed the foundations of racism that the African diaspora still had to confront two centuries later.

The speech of the rector of the university in Wittenberg that was given when Amo submitted his dissertation in 1734 mentions the importance of Amo's work in understanding the situation of the African diaspora in Germany. The speech addresses the treatment of Africans in 18th century Europe and this, it can be argued, accounts for the socio-political positioning of the African diaspora today. Addressing the apologists of European domination and hinting at slavery, the rector says: "Africa once had great prestige, both in terms of talent and in terms of scientific endeavors and ecclesiastical organization. It produced several extraordinary men whose spirited studies produced worldly wisdom and more so,

godliness. [...] In our time, however, this part of the world remains fruitful in other things rather than studies. That its talents have not yet been exhausted, however, may be proven here by the highly famous Master of Philosophy and of the Liberal Arts: Anton Wilhelm Amo, an African from Guinea" (Martin, "Schwarze Teufel", 316).[15]

The appreciation of Amos' work is remarkable in two respects: On one hand, the rector points out the changing perception of Africa at a time when the continent was being exploited.[16] On the other hand, he exposes, with clarity so rare for his time, the social mechanisms that were driven by economic interests and which perpetuated racist ideology. From France to England and Germany, the most influential philosophers have denied the intellectual abilities of Africans and refer to the African as the 'missing link' between man and ape. This can be found in the work of philosophers like Hume, Hegel, Kant as well as Montesquieu and Gobineau, to mention some examples.

After the Berlin Conference convened by Bismarck in 1884/85 the division of Africa among the European powers was sealed and the appearance of the German Empire on the colonial stage began. This expansion of Germany's territory formed the basis for the immigration of a larger number of Africans. Skilled workers from the occupied territories were needed for the colonial administration and for Germany's economy. Young people from German East Africa (Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi), German Southwest Africa (Namibia), Cameroon and Togo came to the German Empire to train as missionary teachers, language assistants, craftsmen, etc. In addition, former *Askaris* – members of the German *Schutztruppen* in the occupied territories in Africa – came. Immigration from Africa marked the beginning of the actual formation of an African diaspora in Germany that is to say, a significant number of people of African descent came to Germany and mobilized themselves for the first time to give voice to their common interests (see Rüger, "Imperialismus"; Sebald, "Eine Geschichte").

One prominent organ under which the interests of the African diaspora found articulation is the bilingual journal *Elolombe ya Kamerun* (Engl. translation: *Sun of Cameroon*) founded in 1908. The journal reported on the situation in the colony of Douala in the German language. In addition to this journal, the German section of the "*League for the Defense of the N- race*" should be mentioned, founded in 1929 by Josef Ekwe Bilé. From today's perspective, it is remarkable that the activities of the African diaspora were not against colonial occupation *per se*, but only against grievances – such as corporal punishment and discrimination of African people from and in the colonies. The extent to which Africans identified with the German *Kaiserreich* is shown by the demands of the diaspora representatives for a "restitution" of the colonies to the Weimar Republic in a petition that Martin Dibobe and his comrades-in-arms addressed to the Bundestag in 1919.[17]

When Germany lost its colonies, the African diaspora was confronted with existential problems. After the Treaty of Versailles, the members of the German colonies were subject to French, English or Belgian laws overnight. For those affected this meant coping with rapid changes in a way that was nearly impossible – apart from their mother tongue(s), they could only speak German. Moreover, they lost their status as members of the so-called "German protectorates" with immediate effect. A vivid example is the story of the most famous African of the Weimar Republic, Martin Dibobe.

Dibobe was born in Cameroon in 1876. He came came to Germany 1896 as a member of a group that was to perform at the *Völkerschau* (Engl. translation: colonial exhibitions). After the six-month tour, he stayed in Berlin and trained as a locksmith and as a first-class train driver. As a politically active migrant, he became involved in the League for Human Rights and on July 27, 1919, he wrote a petition that went down in history as the "Dibobe Petition." In this statement he, together with other representatives of the African diaspora, demanded civil rights for all people from the German colonies. Although he was a civil

servant, he was subsequently relieved of his job. In 1922 he left Germany and returned to Cameroon. However, he was denied entry by the new authorities because they feared pro-German agitation. So, he travelled on to Liberia, where his trail was lost.

The experiences of discrimination became apparent during the economic crisis of the 1920s. Due to the slack labour market situation, it was extremely difficult for people of African descent to find a job. Even access to state unemployment benefits was denied them, as state benefits were only available to German citizens. "Some Africans were supported by a small budget from the Foreign Office, which was administered by the *Gesellschaft für Eingeborenenkunde*, a German colonial association. The monthly allocation of funds was given the condition of good behaviour and could be granted or refused without justification" (Oguntoye, "Afrikanische Zuwanderung").

Beyond the lack of equal rights, the African diaspora experienced massive hostility after the end of the First World War. This aggressive discrimination manifested itself most clearly in the designation 'Rhineland bastards', which refers to the children of German women and African soldiers during the occupation of the Rhineland by French troops. The denigration culminated in vituperative campaigns with posters and coins depicting Africans as monsters and sex criminals. The extent of racism is revealed in the joint protest letter of the political parties – except the USPD – against the occupation troops, in which the position of power of African soldiers on German soil is described as intolerable: "The French and Belgians continue to use coloured troops in the occupied territories of the Rhineland after peace has been concluded. The Germans feel that this misuse of the coloured troops is a disgrace and, observe with growing indignation, that they exercise sovereign rights in German cultural lands. For German women and children, men as well as boys these savages are a terrible danger. Their honour, life and limb, purity and innocence are being destroyed" (Oguntoye 49).

This perception of the African gives an idea of how those affected were treated during the Nazi dictatorship. They lost their passports, had to report weekly to the police and were misused for propaganda purposes. Because of the employment ban, the only form of gainful employment for people from Africa were appearances in colonial films and international shows, which confirmed the audience's racist stereotypes. For example, in one of the most expensive films of the Nazi era, *Münchhausen*, Africans appear as servants. In *Quax in Afrika* racist dialogue demonstrates how uninhibited propagandists were in perpetuating covert forms of racism. This denigrating portrayal was exacerbated by forced sterilization and deportation to concentration camps (cf. Oguntoye 92).

The end of the Nazi dictatorship did not mean rehabilitation for the African diaspora because the century-old racist ideology still prevailed. "People of African descent did not receive reparations. "The concept of the 'racially persecuted' was rather quickly narrowed down to the Jewish people, and soon there was no more talk of the other victims of racism, the Gypsies, the Poles and Russians, and indeed of us Blacks" (Oguntoye 85). Remarkable in this context is the debate about the 94,000 occupation children in the Bundestag in 1952, in which possibilities were sought to simply get the Afro-German children out of the country. According to the weekly newspaper *Das Parlament*: "A special group among the occupation children are the 3093 N-mixed children, who represent a human and racial problem of a special kind. [...] The responsible authorities of the free official youth care have been thinking for years about the fate of these half-breeds, for whom the climatic conditions in our country are not suitable. It has been considered whether it would not be better for them if they were taken to the country of their fathers" (Oguntoye 86).

Scientific studies from the 1950s also show how 'deep-seated' this racist mindset was in academic discourses. Studies labelled "anthropological studies," not only used inhumane terms such as

"bastardization," "bastard population" – as in Hitler's *Mein Kampf* – but also perfidiously claimed that there is an essentialist difference between 'black' and 'white' people. They explicitly distance themselves from ideas of racist theorists such as those by Gobineau only to effectively propagate a racist worldview: "It is not acceptable, of course, that a group of people should be regarded as inferior because they are not equal to certain physical or mental demands due to their racial disposition. Nevertheless, it makes sense to point out the diversity of races and the resulting consequences of miscegenation, from which the mongrel himself has to bear the heaviest burden. This is the task of eugenics or applied anthropology" (Oguntoye 91). What the aforementioned anthropological study's argument leads to conclusions that are based merely on speculation: "As far as the racial factors are concerned, it can be assumed that the developmental advantage which the mulatto children have to show will probably cease with puberty. Intellectual ability in particular is likely to remain moderate, according to available studies of American N-mongrels. On the other hand, it can be assumed that the strong impulsiveness which was shown in the mulatto children will remain a negative racial characteristic" (Oguntoye 92).

From a sociological point of view, exclusion manifested itself at various levels. 70% of Afro-German children were placed in institutions in 1950 (cf. Oguntoye).[18] In 1960, former German President Heinrich Lübke portrayed German colonialism as an altruistic project because, for Germans, "the relationship to the African continent has never been a task of calculation" but one that "'must also be solved with the heart'" (qtd. in Albrecht Monika "Europa," 95).[19] In the media, the ability of Africans to govern their countries is questioned: The first president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, is called a "pathetic unknown N-student," (Albrecht 59) there is unrestrained talk of the "civilizational immaturity of the N-people," and there is even a well-known mocking song about the first prime minister of the Republic of Congo, Patrice Lumumba (Wackwitz 88). In this context, it is easy to imagine what children and young adults have been taught in school textbooks.[20]

15

3.2 Discourses on Migration in Germany: The role of the African diaspora

The edited collection *Farbe Bekennen* can be considered a turning point in the history of the African diaspora in Germany. For the first time, a group of people affected by racism addresses the wider public. Their goal is to "reveal how the social realm of racism connects to their own personal experiences" (Oguntoye 9).[21] In the collection, the authors point out what can be referred to as the 'misdirection' of migration policy. Some of Europe's policies on migration have indirectly resulted into mass deaths at sea. "After 'German unity', 'European unity' is now imminent in 1992. Europe is becoming a political and economic fortress against the rest of the world, especially against countries and people from the so-called Third World. Already today, migration movements and immigration are controlled and stopped by international agreements of Western European countries (e.g. the Schengen Agreement of 1989)"[22] (Oguntoye 12). With the magazines *Afrolook* and *Afrekete* (1988-99), women made a further contribution to the assertion of the African diaspora in Germany by producing the most comprehensive collection of black German poetry and short stories so far.[23] An awareness about the need for the diaspora to mobilize has given rise to further initiatives and organizations, which we will return to later.

The importance of this awareness became clear in the aftermath of the growing hostility in European discourses on migration that is articulated in expressions such as 'flood of asylum seekers,' 'abuse of asylum,' and 'the boat is full'.[24] These terms are commonly used in mass media and by politician. During these years, it became apparent how damaging a one-sided discourse can be and how this can hamper integration. "For the refugee debate in the FRG was and is not only conducted with the flood and boat symbolism in the media. In addition, there is the military symbol complex with which these people are met. [...] The effect of this symbolism is clear: refugees and immigrants become a military threat, pointed columns marching against the Federal Republic, an enemy army besieging the Federal Republic or Western Europe"[25] (Jäger, "Rassismus", 131). Given the prevailing stigmatization of migrants, it was hardly surprising that asylum seekers' homes were attacked, and people of non-European descent were assaulted in the streets. Amadeu Antonio, a contract worker from Angola, was victim to this unbridled racism in Eberswalde on November 24, 1990.

The fact that he was murdered in East Germany refuted the propaganda of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which had rendered racism 'alien' in so-called socialist societies. This narrative was matched by the regime's mediatized release of African-American activist and avowed Communist, Angela Davis, who was even received by then-head of state Erich Honecker in 1972. Contrary to proclaimed efforts of creating a fraternity, the GDR's migration policy was based on the state-based isolation of African and Asian contract workers. The chimera of an anti-racist GDR was exposed, not least, after the attacks in Hoyerswerda (in September 1991) and Rostock-Lichtenhagen (in August 1992).

For the African diaspora – like other non-European migrants – the 1990s marked the peak of overt forms of discrimination. Despite the violence and murders, politicians and the media fuelled anti-immigration sentiment. Particularly politicians of the CDU/CSU (which constitutes the political alliance of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union of Bavaria) fanned public resentment against migration. In the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), top candidate Jürgen Rüttgers' campaign team came up with the slogan "*Kinder statt Inder*" (Engl. translation: "Children instead of Indians") as a poignant response to the Social Democrats' (SPD's) move that had made it easier for Indian IT specialists to migrate to Germany. In Bavaria, the then Prime Minister, Edmund Stoiber, voiced a warning against what he referred to as "*Durchrassung*" of German society. In the state of Hesse, Prime Minister Roland Koch mobilized the population against the plans of the government led by the SPD and the Greens to allow dual citizenship. The plans of the government would enable many migrants with

dual citizenship to participate in political decision-making processes both in Germany and their home countries.

Considerably similar attitudes towards migration were re-iterated in German media. This became apparent in arson attacks targeted at migrants in Germany and fanned by the supporters of the right-wing. "But something different was added to media representation of migrants and migration. German media accomplished the feat of simultaneously being outraged by racially motivated attacks while, at the same time, perpetuating racist attitudes"[26] (Jäger, "Rassismus", 132). The press analyses came to a unanimous conclusion "that the message behind the outcry in much of the press and almost all authors was to solve the problem by closing borders, deporting 'undocumented' refugees, etc" (ibid.). [27] Under this pretext, the laws for asylum seeking were changed that is, they were undermined. It was during this period that the neo-Nazi terror cell, NSU (National Socialist Underground), was founded. The NSU is responsible for committing ten crimes of murder on so-called "foreigners" (people who, judging from their biological features or phenotype, are visibly 'non-European').

Upon this backdrop, the African diaspora not only faced stigmatization in politics and the media, but they were also subject to discrimination by police officers. In addition to racial profiling, people of African descent were often subjected to police violence, which they have, on more than one occasion, paid for with their lives. For instance, the case of the 26-year-old Senegalese woman, Marème Sarr, who was shot dead in 2001 in Aschaffenburg by one of the police officers that had been called in to solve a marital dispute between Sarr and her husband. The media hardly reported on this case. The same thing also applies to Oury Diallo from Sierra Leone who burned to death in a police cell in Dessau in 2005 under mysterious circumstances – to name just a few examples.

17

That xenophobia in Germany has not regressed is apparent given the rise of the right-wing populist party, AfD (Alternative for Germany), and similar groups – such as *Pegida* and the *Identitarian Movement* – who shamelessly instigate anti-migrant sentiment and propagate a racist model of society. The murders in Kassel in 2019 and Hanau in 2020, as well as the attempted murder in Halle in 2019, illustrate how concrete right-wing extremist terror can be. This is quite alarming because discriminatory tendencies are on rise in almost all European countries. While everyone fleeing war has the right to find refuge according to laws governing asylum in the EU, it is worth noting that Ukrainian refugees were welcomed in Germany in a more open-minded way in 2022 compared to the sentiment of rejection that clouded the reception of refugees from African or Arab countries in Germany, particularly in 2015-2016. Media houses in Germany and in much of Europe displayed discriminatory tendencies by pushing for a rhetoric of humanization and sympathy towards refugees because they "are European people with blue eyes and blonde hair" (Bayoumi, "They are civilised"). In addition, the fact that Ukrainian men between the ages 18 and 60 of were obligated to stay behind and defend their country made it common place for media to publish images of mainly female refugees and children. A similar level of sympathy did not always accompany reporting about refugees from the Middle East and Africa, on the contrary. Reporting by European media houses on migration from Syria and Afghanistan capitalized on fearmongering that was implicated in images of mostly young, able-bodied men arriving in Europe.

The activities of the *Initiative Schwarze Menschen in Deutschland* (ISD), an NGO in Germany that is run by Afro-German individuals, are directed at addressing various forms of unequal treatment of black people and people of African descent in Germany. In a sense, it has taken on the legacy of the *Farbe bekennen* ("Showing our colours") campaign. As the largest black-led organization in Germany, the ISD not only gives a voice to the African diaspora, but also promotes community-building in ways that helps its members strengthen their 'consciousness' and solidarity: "ISD represents the interests of Black people in society and politics and aims to influence legislation. The issues of everyday racism, racist

violence and police violence are central focal points of our work. For us, black resistance is first and foremost a struggle for the perception of these perspectives."[28] Besides the ISD, countless associations work on overcoming marginalization and on the emancipation of people of African origin. For example, Each One Teach One (EOTO),[29] the *Zentralrat der afrikanischen Gemeinde in Deutschland* or the *Afrikanischen Dachverband-Nord*,[30] to name just a few examples. This includes country-specific associations such as *Völkermord verjährt nicht*, which advocates for the recognition of the genocide in Namibia and for reparations while supporting associations for women and students.

While these organizations are effective in their socio-political endeavors in Germany, private individuals are making their mark on the transnational level. Apart from associations that support projects in African countries (of origin), it is private individuals that provide the bulk of monetary transfers to Africa's private sector. In 2022, monetary remittances worth $64 billion were sent African countries. For this reason, the diaspora now has acquired the status of 6th region in the African Union (AU).[31] Accordingly, the African diaspora has created a government and initiated projects in key sectors of different African countries. However, it must be said that the economic sector lacks funding and hence it lacks the appropriate financial structures required by members of the African diaspora to set up sustainable projects in Africa.[32] As far as development cooperation policies and the problems of migration are concerned, the diaspora, both in Germany and elsewhere, offers a viable alternative to controversial models. The idea of 'addressing the root causes of migration' (*Fluchtursachenbekämpfung*) cannot be successful if carried out with the help of dictators or kleptocrats. Instead, it is important to consider the potential of working with the African diaspora and, in so doing, engage in transnational cooperation that will bring about sustainable socioeconomic growth in countries of origin, particularly, since a number of initiatives have already been put in place.

4. Conclusion

This paper examines the narrative dynamics of one-sided narratives and perspectives about migration from Africa. Of particular interest is the term *Fluchtursachenbekämpfung* which has dominated public debates about migration from Africa. Competing perspectives to this 'grand' narrative come from academic research and literature on migration that shows its blind spots; a strong focus on Africa and a lack of consideration for the potential of (irregular) migration to contribute to economic growth in host and home countries.

Using the level telling field as a premise, the discussion in chapter 3 highlights the importance of a change in perspective in the migration debate. While public debates about migration give more 'air time' to policy makers – many of whom are not migrants – the discussion in chapter 3 adds a historical and conceptual contour to migration from Africa by exploring the term diaspora, race and the origins and contributions of diasporic communities and migrants to Germany. Exploring these terms and concepts shows the complex web of movements and experiences embedded in the fabric of migration from Africa. We hope that awareness of this complexity makes enables more balanced debates in which different stakeholders such as, policy makers are involved in meaningful exchange of ideas with migrants and members of the African diaspora.

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
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Endnotes

[1] The entire speech can be found on the homepage of the federal government: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/rede-von-bundeskanzlerin-dr-angela-merkel-452842.

[2] The homepage of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa can be found at: www.ec.europa.eu.

[3] The ETUF annual report (2018) can be found here: www.ec.europa.eu. (Accessed July 10, 2022)

[4] In 2017 a CNN news team released footage of and an exclusive report about African migrants being sold by smugglers. The video shows about a dozen men auctioned at different 'markets' that are reminiscent of slave markets. Some migrants were auctioned for as little as $400 each. The footage sent waves of outrage across social media prompting hashtags such as the #slaveryinlibya hashtag that trended on Twitter in 2017.
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/14/africa/libya-migrant-auctions/index.html.

[5] The migration hump theory is "based on the observation that growing per capita income is often related to improved levels of education and training, but that those benefitting from this find only limited opportunities for appropriate employment in their local labour markets" (Angenendt et al., "More Development", 2). This subsequently means that migration becomes a more appealing option and, as Angenendt et al. argue, "a higher income level makes migration easier, as a degree of capital is required (ibid.).

[6] The Erasmus program aims at promoting closer cooperation between universities and higher education in Europe by setting up a system of mobility for students and staff that enable cross-border student exchange. Today the program's breadth has extended to include mobility in training, youth and sports in Europe. Furthermore, the mobility of EU citizens is no longer limited to Europe but also beyond. The new name for the program is Erasmus+. More information about the Erasmus+ program can be found on the homepage of the European Commission:
https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/de/about-erasmus/history-funding-and-future#intro (Accessed: July 21, 2023).

[7] https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/programme-guide/part-a/priorities-of-the-erasmus-programme/objectives-features.
(Accessed: July 20, 2023).

[8] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ (Accessed: June 23, 2023).

[9] https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/UNDP-Scaling-Fences-EN-2019.pdf. (Accessed: July 10, 2022)

[10] Brubaker instead suggests considering diaspora as a category of practice that is used to make claims, formulate expectations and appeal to loyalties (cf. Brubaker 12). Ultimately, such claims, expectations and loyalties should be the focus of diaspora scholarship rather than assuming that these claims will necessarily lead to bounded groups (cf. Brubaker 13). Brubaker's suggestion articulates a challenge facing contemporary scholarship of diaspora that uses constructivism as a conceptual framework; "How is a group constituted as such, without the assumption that it is marked by some form of essentialism and requires boundaries and their maintenance in order to retain its distinctiveness?" (Tsolidis 6)

[11] While Anderson's definition of imagined communities begins with the nation state as its backdrop (cf. Brubaker 4), this paper uses his term 'imagined community' to define diasporic communities as entities that may or may not be uncoupled from the nation state.

[12] The racialization of black African people dates back to recorded first encounters between Africans and European travelers in West Africa in the period leading up to the Transatlantic Slave Trade. Some 16th and 17th century travel writings by English explorers that have recorded encounters between English travelers in West Africa are examples of discursive practices that not only racialize Africans but also perpetuate an asymmetrical notion of race based on binary oppositions such as 'black' and savage' that postcolonial scholars have long critiqued (Boulukos, "The Grateful Slave"). Hall ("Cultural Identity", 222) posits that black cultural identity or what he labels 'the diaspora experience' is not an 'essence' but rather a result of the ways that individuals and groups 'position' themselves or the ways in which they are 'positioned' in discourses of the past. 'Positioning is the idea that "[w]e all write and speak from a particular place and time, from a history and a culture which is specific. What we say is always in context, *positioned*."

[13] The *Afrozensus* report is the first official statistical report that gives voice to the diverse experiences of black, afro-diasporic and African people in Germany. More information about the *Afrozensus* report can be found here: https://afrozensus.de.

[14] According to the Federal Bureau of Statistics the statistics from the year 2020 showed that roughly 985.000 black and Afro-German people live in Germany.

[15] Translated into English by the authors. The original quote in German reads as follows: „Groß war einst das Ansehen Afrikas, sowohl im Hinblick auf die Talente als auch in Bezug auf die wissenschaftlichen Bestrebungen und die kirchliche Organisation. Brachte es doch mehrere ganz außerordentliche Männer hervor, durch deren geistvolle Studien die Weltweisheit und noch mehr die Gottesgelehrtheit begründet worden ist. […] Zu unserer Zeit aber soll dieser Erdteil fruchtbar sein an anderen Dingen als an Studien. Daß er aber nicht erschöpft ist an Begabungen, das möge hier durch sein Beispiel beweisen der Hochberühmte Magister der Philosophie und der Freien Künste: Anton Wilhelm Amo, Afrikaner aus Guinea" (Martin, "Schwarze Teufel", 316).

[16] In the Middle Ages, the African embodied the ideal image of the knight, as can be seen for example in Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Parzival*.

¹⁷ Petitionen von Martin Dibobe et al am Kolonialamt und an der Nationalversammlung (1919). Barch R1001 7220, Bl. 130-1, 231

¹⁸ In the documentary film *Schwarz und deutsch* (Engl. translation: *Black and German*), a journalist persistently asks a young mother why she does not want to give her Afro-German child up for adoption.

¹⁹ Translated by the authors. The original quote reads as follows: „das Verhältnis zum afrikanischen Kontinent niemals eine Rechenaufgabe gewesen", sondern eine, die „„auch mit dem Herzen gelöst werden [müsse]'". The author also remarks that: "But this statement also shows that politicians at the beginning of the 1960s could count on such vague allusions to German colonial history being understood." (ibd.)

²⁰ In 2001 Anke Poenicke noted in a study of current school textbooks: "'Racial' traits are emphasized as well as the idea of 'mixed-race' vs. 'racially pure people'. Even the racist notion of linking physical features and psychological ability with cultural traits has persisted in some books. Divisions and classifications that had become scientifically untenable long before the publication of the books analyzed are being put to use, cultural hierarchies are being revived – and all this is done using age-old racist terminology." (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. 29).

²¹ Translated by the authors. The original quote reads as follows: „[…] in Verbindung mit persönlichen Erfahrungen gesellschaftliche Zusammenhänge von Rassismus offen[zu]legen" (Oguntoye 9).

²² Translated by authors. Original quote reads as follows: „Nach der ‚deutschen Einheit' steht nun die ‚europäische Einheit' 1992 bevor. Europa entwickelt sich zu einer politischen und ökonomischen Festung gegen den Rest der Welt., vor allem gegen Länder und Menschen der sogenannten Dritten Welt. Schon heute werden Migrationsbewegungen und Immigration durch internationale Abkommen westeuropäischer Länder kontrolliert und gestoppt (z. B. das Schengen-Abkommen von 1989)" (Oguntoye 12).

²³ The magazine *Awa Finnaba* (1983-1988), founded by African writers and artists in exile, should be mentioned because it also made a significant contribution to the production of black German poetry and short stories.

²⁴ One of the key concepts of the OPPORTUNITIES project is the distinction between stories *of* migration and narratives *on* migration (Gebauer and Sommer, "Beyond", 8). The former refer to stories about migrant and refugee experiences from an emic perspective that is, by individuals who are, or have been, migrants and refugees themselves. The latter are the kinds of "abstract narratives which define the public debate on migration from a specific angle (e.g. political, legal, economic, or scientific). They are abstract narratives about migration from an etic (observer's) perspective. Gebauer and Sommer (9) posit that such abstract narratives can serve nationalist ends: "Nationalist narratives frame migration as a threat to sovereignty". Such nationalist narratives, for instance, may employ metaphors for migration that are supposed to serve their nationalist ends; for instance, the metaphor of the "flood" and the "full boat" reference countless numbers migrants seeking refuge while "abuse" of asylum emphasizes the lawlessness of migrants who pose an economic burden to Fortress Europe.

²⁵ Translated by the authors. The original quote reads as follows: „Denn die Flüchtlingsdebatte in der BRD wurde und wird nicht nur mit der Flut- und Boot-Symbolik in den Medien geführt. Hinzu kommt der militärische Symbol-Komplex, mit dem diesen Menschen begegnet wird. […] Der Effekt dieser Symbolik ist deutlich: Flüchtlinge und Einwanderer werden zur militärischen Bedrohung, zu spitzen Kolonnen, die gegen die Bundesrepublik marschieren, zur feindlichen Armee, die die Bundesrepublik bzw. Westeuropa belagert (Jäger, "Afrikabilder", 131).

²⁶ Translated by the authors. The original quote reads as follows: „Doch es ist noch etwas anderes hinzugekommen. Die Medien vollbrachten das Kunststück, sich zugleich über die rassistisch motivierten Überfälle zu empören und rassistische Einstellungen weiter zu verfestigen" (Jäger, 132).

²⁷ Translated by the authors. The original quote reads as follows; „dass nahezu unisono die hinter dem Aufschrei verborgene Botschaft fast der gesamten Presse und nahezu aller AutorInnen darauf hinauslief, das Problem dadurch zu lösen, dass man die Grenzen dicht machen müsse, dass die ‚unberechtigten' Flüchtlinge abzuschieben seien etc" (Jäger 132).

²⁸ https://isdonline.de/ueber-uns/#werwirsind (25.06.2023, translated by the authors). The original quote reads as follows: Die ISD vertritt die Interessen von Schwarzen Menschen in Gesellschaft und Politik und will auf die Gesetzgebung Einfluss nehmen. Die Themen Alltagsrassismus, rassistische Gewalt und Polizeigewalt sind zentrale Schwerpunkte der Arbeit. Schwarzer Widerstand ist für uns in erster Linie ein Kampf um die Wahrnehmung dieser Perspektiven."

²⁹ "Each One Teach One e.V. is a community-based education and empowerment project in Berlin. Founded in 2012, the association opened its doors in March 2014 as a neighbourhood library and has been a place of learning and encounter ever since" (https://eoto-archiv.de/, 25.06.23). Together with other organisations, EOTO e.V. campaigns for the interests of Black, African and Afro-diasporic people in Germany and Europe.

³⁰ "We are the nexus between politics, the public and communities of people of African origin. We do lobbying and committee work at political, social and institutional levels. We develop strategies and measures to counter anti-black racism. We develop projects for the understanding of democracy, for the strengthening of the plural society, in order to make the needs and concerns of people of African origin visible." (https://zentralrat-afrikagemeinde.de/unsere-arbeit/, 25.06.2023, translated by the authors).

³¹ In Senegal, for example, the diaspora elects 15 of the 165 members to the National Assembly.

³² MacoopA is an example of an initiative and service provider, based in Germany, that supports individuals and organizations living in and outside Africa in setting up financial structures and business projects in Africa. Its services include providing business development management and training for diasporic individuals and organizations. (https://macoopa.one/about-2/, 29.06.2023).

opportunities

for a fair narrative on migration